Abstract-In this paper, we investigate further the way information disseminates from informed to uninformed traders in a market populated by heterogeneous boundedly rational agents. In order to achieve our goal, we construct a computer simulated market where only a
and their beliefs about other agents' forecasts) upon observing the Walrasian equilibrium price. Agents then trade accordingly until asset prices finally reflect all available information. Private information is in this way transferred across traders. Moreover, because in equilibrium disagreement about the true price vanishes, there are no reasons to trade, and volume should be zero. In the real world private information is not observable, so researchers have relied on experiments conducted in laboratories to test for the validity of the theory. In experimental markets with human agents and asymmetrically distributed information, Plott and Sunder (1982) and Forsythe et al. (1982) find support for the RE hypothesis: when uninformed agents coexist with informed traders, market prices converge after some time towards RE equilibrium prices2. This evidence is considered favorable to the RE model. In experiments with human traders, agents' strategies are beyond the researcher's control and their expectations are not observable. For this reason, computer simulated markets3 have arised as alternative laboratories to study the convergence property of the double auction trading system. In an early study, Gode and Sunder (1993) construct a simple double auction market4 where investors 1 See, for instance, Lucas (1972) , Green (1973) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Grossman (1981) , and Hellwig (1980 and Hellwig ( , 1982 . 2In other experiments, however, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) find that both trading experience and common knowledge of agents' information structures were necessary to achieve the RE equilibrium. 3See Lebaron (2000 Lebaron ( , 2001 for a more detailed view of agentbased financial markets. 4 In Gode and Sunder (1993) unaccepted limit orders are deleted with each transaction, unlike in a real market where limit orders stay in the book until matched by subsequent market orders or canceled by the trader who submitted them.
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submit random orders, and show that the market price converges to the equilibrium price as long as traders are not allowed to buy or sell at a loss. In a more recent study, Chan et al. (2001) study information dissemination in a market populated by boundedly rational investors with heterogeneous trading strategies, which include technical analysis rules and Bayesian learning. They find prices converge fast to the RE equilibrium price when investors have homogeneous preferences, but the model fails if this condition does not hold. In this paper, we investigate further the way information transmits from informed to uninformed traders in a market populated by boundedly rational agents. In order to achieve this goal, we construct a market where only a small fraction of the population observe the risky asset's fundamental value with noise, while the rest of agents try to forecast-in different ways-the asset's price from past transaction data. Our market departs from Chan et al. (2001) in that the risky asset pays no dividend so agents cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. Consequently, convergence to the asset's fundamental price can only be attributed to private information being disseminated in the market. This distinction is important because Yang (2002) lnPf,+A 0 {n Pf +ru2j-A,-\ AJ (1) where A is the time interval between two trading periods (we set A = 250-l) and fb denotes the normal density function. The continuously compounded fundamental return, computed as the difference in logs, is normally distributed, serially independent and has constant variance.
Agents and trading
All agents are risk neutral and myopic. Their objective function is therefore the expected value of their wealth at the end of each trading period. In order to form this expectation, i-th agent forecasts the risky asset's price at the end of the current trading period, P7', and buys as long as the best ask price is at least S dollars below his forecast. Similarly, he sells as long as the best bid price is at least S dollars above his forecast. This assumption is necessary to incorporate explicit transaction costs such as broker commission or fees: investors will trade only if the expected profit from trading is high enough to offset the cost of trading. Note, however, that a higher value of S will decrease the volume/frequency of trading. In our simulations, the exact value of S for each agent at each round is a realization from a uniformn distribution. The agent can also submit a new bid (PI'-S) or ask (PI' +S). The agent's limit order is subsequently added to the limit order book in the corresponding position. Table  1 displays the agents' decision process. Agents differ from each other in the way they obtain their forecast of the risky asset's price. In our market we consider four different classes of agents: i) Zero Intelligence (ZI) agents. In our market, ZI agents serve as liquidity providers, since they introduce discrepancy in the risky asset's valuation. Their prediction for the risky asset's price is a realization of a random variable which is uniformly distributed around the last transaction price:
Pt U(0-9prsLlp,) where r denotes the last time the risky asset was traded. This way of modelling ZI agents' behavior depart from that of Gode and Sunder (1993) , since in our market ZI agents modify their prediction with every transaction. Consequently, if the market where exclusively populated with ZI agents we would not expect convergence to the "equilibrium price" since a high (low) transaction price would shift expectations for all agents upwards (downwards). Moreover, they enable us to assess the effect of informed-based trading on uninformed traders' wealth. corresponding outputs. An ANN is composed of a number of processing units which are hierarchically organized in layers. The input layer consists of a set of nodes that receive the information from the outside world. The hidden layer processes the information while the output layer sends the signal to the outside8. The most widely used structure is that of a feedforward neural net in which the information is hierarchically processed in a single way from the input layer to the output through the hidden layer(s). The units are connected through a synaptic weight which determines quantitatively the influence of one unit on the other. Specifically, the ANN agents we use a feedforward neural net with a unique hidden layer9, "h" input units, and a unique unit in the output layer to form their expectation about next period's return. It is important to highligh that the net is not fix during a simulation, is trained each "im" trading periods (More specifically, we select the parameters, h = 10, m = 50, and the number of epochs used in the training of nets is 200). Therefore, as the market becomes more efficient, the ANN agents are capable of training the net in a more efficient way, and therefore the ANN agents evolve towards more efficient agents. iv). Technical Analysts (TA). These agents attempt to identify trends in price series. In particular, they compute the average close price of last s trading periods and the average close price of last 1 periods, where s is either 1, 2 or 5 periods with equal probability and 1 can take the following values: 50, 150 or 200, also with equal probability. If the short moving average is higher than the long moving average the TA will think the market is bullish and will want to buy the risky asset. Otherwise, he will sell10. TA's actions therefore differ slightly from those of the rest of agents. In particular, in a bullish market, a TA will buy at the prevailing ask price, a, if there is at least one ask price with Pti > a + S, where p1< is taken to be price of the last transaction. Otherwise, they will submit a limit order to buy with bid equals to Pt -S.
Analogously, in a bearish market, TAs will sell at the prevailing bid price, b, if there is at least one bid price with P,' < b -S and will submit a limit order to sell with ask equal to P,' +S, otherwise.
At the beginning of each simulation, each agent receives an identical endowment consisting of 3,000 dollars and 30 units of the risky asset. Since TAs and ANN agents require a minimum number of transactions before they start to trade, wealth is reinitialized again when all agents operate simultaneously. For this reason, in the first 200 periods only informed agents and ZI agents participate and we do not take into account these results in our futher analysis.
Equilibrium
Given the risk neutral assumption and the restriction to buying or selling one unit of the asset, in the absence of explicit transaction costs, the Walrasian equilibrium price roughly corresponds to the sample median of individuals' expectations. To see this point assume zero explicit transaction costs and no budget constraint. If we let FN( ) and N denote the empirical distribution of Pi and the number of agents, respectively, the demand function for the risky asset then equals QD(p) = N (1-FN(P)) whereas the supply function is given by Qs(P) = N FN(P). The market-clearing price is such that:
(1-FN(P)) = FN(P), which is exactly the sample median price expectation. Introducing a fixed explicit transaction cost, S, changes the above condition to (1-FN(P+S)) = FN(P-S). The equilibrium price, P*, is therefore not affected as long as FN(P*+S)_FN(P*) = FN(P*)-FN(P*-S), but the number of units exchanged is necessarily lower. The noisy RE equilibrium price results from updating a prior distribution about the fundamental price upon observing price signals received by all informed traders. For a sufficiently high number of signals or for sufficiently precise signals, this noisy RE equilibrium price is close to the fundamental price. Note that in this market, convergence to the RE price can be achieved as long as informed investors influence the Walrasian equilibrium price, since the rest of investors will react to observed price changes.
Simulation design
In order to analyze the sensitivity of market's efficiency to market parameters we have simulated 10 paths of fundamental values according to (1) with a different ,u for each path (uniformly distributed between +1-5%), and Pf0 =100. The reason why we let ,u change is to ensure that results do not depend on a specific market trend. Next, for each fundamental path, we have simulated a total of 1,000 trading periods, changing one of the market parameters at a time11. More specifically, we have considered the parameter sets shown in Table 2 . Informed investors not only ensure convergence to price fundamentals, but also reduce randomnes in transaction prices as suggested by Table 3 . The top panel (prices), on the other hand helps explain the poor efficiency results of Table 4 .While transaction prices in Market 1 tend to track the fundamental path in most periods, from period 200 to period 350, the market experiences a crash. This crash starts with a sharp decline in the asset's price followed by periods of stability, and finally, a quick return to the fundamental path that is not abandoned again. Finally, the medium panel shows that trade volume peaks when prices fall and rise, and remains relatively low in between. In order to understand the crash in Market 1, we look at the evolution of agents' average positions per investor class, which are shown in Figure 3 . In Markets 2 and 3, we investigate the effect of a reduction in the number of ANN and TA, respectively. Tables 5 and 6 provide an explanation for information dissemination in the double auction market. The highest correlations are those between the market price and the Walrasian price. This implies that the market's median expectation in this market reacts fast to past transaction prices. Consequently, when informed investors' orders are able to shift transaction prices in the "right" direction, subsequent convergence of transaction prices to the fundamental price is almost assured. The main lesson from Tables 5 and 6 is that boundedly rational investors' ad hoc responses to market prices appear "as though" investors rationally update their beliefs about the true asset price which in turn leads to a RE-like equilibrium. Finally, all but one correlation coefficient is marginally higher in Table 6 than its counterpart in Table 5 . In other words, as time passes, prices become more efficient. This effect, however, cannot be attributed to learning, since it is present even when there are no ANN agents in the market. We conjecture that the higher wealth accumulated by informed investors in the second part of the series, diminishes the probability of their budget constraint becoming binding, and hence strengthens their capacity to influence prices.
Summary and conclusions
The idea that private information can disseminate well in continuous double auction markets has found support both in experiments with humans and with computational agents. The exact mechanism through which such transfer 2459 V of information is possible, however, deserves a further look. This paper is an attempt to shed light on this issue with important implications for both academics and market structure designers. Our main finding is that when investors respond, even in mechanical ways, to transaction prices, minor shifts in these prices can potentially alter the median investor's beliefs towards the intrinsic asset value. If informed traders are a sufficient fraction of total investor population, their trades have the potential to bring prices to the fundamental path. This ability, however, is limited by borrowing and short-selling restrictions, which prevents them from bidding up prices in a stock market crash or offering the asset when it is highly overvalued. The presence of other investors, or increased explicit transaction costs, introduces noise in the system and has interesting effects on market dynamics, but does not alter the main conclusions regarding information dissemination.
The idea that short sale or borrowing constraints can prevent information or opinions from being expressed in stock prices is not new. Miller (1977) or Diamond and Verrechia (1987) Bibliography
